A proposal for a Kuwaiti authority to support non-oil export output, productivity, private-sector independence, and sustainable growth.
Whoever reflects on the journey of nations knows that their greatness is not measured by the wealth nature grants them, but by the sources of strength and continuity they create for themselves. Minerals are depleted from beneath the earth, wells may run dry, and resources, however great, remain hostage to shortage and fluctuation. But minds, when properly invested in, and hands, when given fields in which to work, are the only sources that supply nations with what does not run out.
From this perspective, the Kuwaiti scene becomes clearer. Describing its economy as rentier is no longer merely a passing statement repeated in books and studies, nor a critical label circulated by certain elites in their gatherings. It has become a deeply rooted reality, pulsing through the joints of daily life and leaving its mark on the relationship between citizen and state, and on the image of public administration and its institutions.
A rentier economy, by its nature, is not built on sweat poured into workshops and factories, nor on minds that create and innovate in the fields of production. It rests instead on a single resource whose returns flow from abroad, then are redistributed internally through a centralized spirit that removes the need for effort and sidelines the necessity of self-construction.
In Kuwait’s case, oil was the resource that established decades of welfare and ease, and built a unique social contract between state and society. Yet, as the years passed, it began to plant the seeds of silent defects and accumulated crises, whose signs are now clearly visible and which call, by both condition and word, for deep reform that restores value to production and work, and preserves the nation’s balance and continuity.
Oil rent flows into the state’s treasury, then is pumped back into its veins and the veins of society in the form of salaries and pensions, subsidies and allowances, tenders and practices, purchase orders and similar channels, until most of the national workforce, in both the public and private sectors, has become dependent on the state’s ability to spend from this single resource. While gross domestic product, in basic economics, rests on four pillars — government expenditure, investment, consumption, and oil and non-oil export output — Kuwait’s reality has activated only what is connected to oil revenues. It has relied on three pillars: government expenditure, consumption, and oil export output. These are fragile wings that expand when prices are abundant and contract when they decline, offering neither stability nor sustainability. As for true productive investment and non-oil export output, they are the two remaining pillars capable of carrying the economy to safety. They are the path taken by a very rare few private-sector institutions, which found in expanding exports abroad, reducing supply into the domestic market, or combining both paths a way to free themselves from the captivity of oil fluctuations and the burdens of austerity policies. Meanwhile, most other institutions remained trapped in the circle of “consumption,” held within the grip of “government spending,” and, by their nature and by the reality of the economic environment, draining “export output” by maximizing the state’s non-oil imports.
Over long decades, that equation produced an economic and social reality that gradually took shape until the link between productivity and income began to fade. Mastery at work and seriousness in performance were no longer firm pillars of job stability. In many cases, loyalty and mutual benefit became the easier path to advancement and rise, despite the fact that work was, and remains, a divine standard before it is an economic one, as reflected in the words of the Almighty: “And say, ‘Work, for Allah will see your work, and His Messenger and the believers’” (At-Tawbah: 105). Over the years, an administrative pyramid rose, built in part on the pillars of loyalties, and its cohesion strengthened as broad layers of employees grew more dependent on what flowed from rentier resources. Thus, incentives for serious work declined, patterns of negligence and slackness appeared, and these phenomena became part of the features of the economic and social structure. Their effects are visible in declining services, weakening institutional efficiency, and a poor environment for nurturing talents and creative competencies.
Yet this reality, accumulated over decades, did not escape the state’s sight or insight. In recent times, its agencies have turned their attention to the defects that have taken root, recognizing that addressing them is no longer an intellectual luxury or a postponed option, but an embodiment of a religious duty before it is counted as a national obligation requiring firmness, in response to the words of the Almighty: “Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between people to judge with justice” (An-Nisa: 58). The recent decisions of the Council of Ministers came as evidence of a deep realization that reforming the economic structure cannot be achieved except by restoring value to efficiency and productivity, doing justice to sincere capacities, and shaping a new environment capable of elevating seriousness and creativity, and restoring the nation’s balance and sustainability. This is grounded in a deep awareness that Kuwait, as it faces unprecedented financial challenges, no longer has the luxury of waiting or standing still. National responsibility now requires, and sovereign will now demands, that the rudder of the economy be redirected toward the horizon of sustainability, so that it becomes capable of shielding the state from market fluctuations and protecting the dignity and rights of future generations.
The question then arises: is it reasonable for the attraction of rare competencies and the rise of productivity rates to remain hostage to scattered initiatives and partial decisions, taken in one sector or another in a limited individual manner? Or is it more proper and more necessary to build an integrated economic structure whose foundation is firmly rooted in making creativity a culture rather than an exception, and productivity a necessary condition that cannot be dispensed with, so that effort and mastery become natural requirements for institutional continuity, and a just scale for their prosperity and survival?
Here the serious question appears: has the time not come for the nation to create an institutional instrument, framed by precise legislation, that moves sovereign will from the space of wishes into the arena of tangible work? Has the time not come for the proposal to establish the “Public Authority for Supporting Non-Oil Export Output” to be placed under consideration — an independent authority that advances sound policies and well-designed plans, strengthens national productivity, opens the doors of export output, and gradually frees it from the chains of dependency on state money? Would such an entity not introduce, for the first time, precise measurement mechanisms that weigh by numbers rather than whims the private sector’s share in the body of the national economy through two clear indicators: one for non-oil export output, and another for the extent of its dependence on state resources? And would it not be more fitting and just for the authority to be funded by symbolic tax revenues borne generally by the private sector, while exempting those who choose the path of sustainability by adopting export expansion, supply reduction, or a combination of both as a method of continuity? The surplus from those revenues would then become a tributary flowing into the state treasury under the noble title of non-oil revenues.
Through this prudent path, economic success becomes dependent on the ability of institutions to create, produce, and carry their goods and services into wider markets — not on their proximity to, or distance from, the channels and narrow gateways of rentier income. Under this vision, the citizen becomes firmly certain that their welfare and stability are not built on the rise and fall of the price of a barrel of oil, but on a solid foundation of a real, productive, and diversified economy whose pillars are work, creativity, and export. It is a new equation through which the economic and social contract between the state and its people is reformulated, based on a conscious partnership between the public and private sectors, led by a sovereign will aware that Kuwait’s enduring strength, dignity, and prosperity can only come through a strong and diversified economy: sustainable in its resources, just in its giving, and resilient in the face of time’s fluctuations and market storms.
The establishment of this authority is not merely an additional bureaucratic body in the state’s structure, nor a numerical increase in the body of institutions. In essence, it is a clear declaration of a strategic transformation of profound depth and meaning: a transition from a rentier consumer economy that has long pulled the nation backward, to a productive competitive economy that opens broad horizons for its future; a transition from dependence on a single resource that rises and falls with market winds, to genuine diversification of income sources that ensures stability and protects generations from the storms of the unseen; and a transition from a culture of loyalty and courtesy that weakened the structure, to a culture of efficiency and merit that raises the building and strengthens its pillars. It is not merely an authority in appearance, but a speaking expression of a determined strategy seeking to fulfill a promising sovereign desire: to shield the nation from the dangers of single-resource dependence, and to hand the trust to future generations in the form of a country capable of endurance, firm in its pillars, free in its will, neither captive to oil fluctuations nor hostage to market moods.
Kuwait today stands at a decisive crossroads in history. It can either return to reproducing its past with all its defects and crises, continuing to circle within the same loop that exhausted its resources and strained its structure; or it can choose to move along a new path worthy of its standing among nations, equal to its proud history, and capable of founding a broader future. On this desired path, the “Public Authority for Supporting Non-Oil Export Output” appears as a pivotal step, not to be measured by the scale of procedural laws, nor reduced to legislative texts alone. Rather, it marks the beginning of a new covenant between the state and its society: one that makes sustainability an original pillar of economic construction, and makes productivity and merit the title of a future more solid, more just, and closer to the ambitions of generations seeking a homeland safe from the defects of dependency, free from the pains of repetition, and moving forward in building a strong economy that restores Kuwait’s place in leadership and prosperity. If Kuwait takes this path, it will preserve its role and standing, and protect for future generations the promise of a bright future.
O Allah, ordain for this nation a matter of right guidance...
Abdullah Al-Salloum
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What does the factor of institutions reveal about public spending?
Productive spending adds capacity or productivity, while spending that repeats obligations expands the burden without building new income. Through the angle of institutions, the result appears not only in declared language, but in the policy’s ability to change incentives and outcomes.
What does the factor of institutions reveal about fiscal sustainability?
Sustainability is not secured by revenue size alone; it depends on turning resources into renewable financial capacity while controlling recurring obligations. Through the angle of institutions, the result appears not only in declared language, but in the policy’s ability to change incentives and outcomes.
What does the factor of institutions reveal about public obligations?
A state’s financial strength weakens as fixed obligations expand, because the room for reform narrows even when revenues appear large. Through the angle of institutions, the result appears not only in declared language, but in the policy’s ability to change incentives and outcomes.
How does non-oil export output and sustainable growth affect Kuwait?
Its effect appears in how costs, incentives, and resources are managed, and in Kuwait's ability to turn decisions into sustainable value. The direct context is for a Kuwaiti authority to support non-oil export output, productivity, private-sector independence, and sustainable growth.