Opinions differ regarding Kuwaiti democracy and whether it constitutes an obstacle to development because of its alleged poor application, especially when compared with the French or British experiences. But is it meaningful to compare the outputs of a political system within a rentier economy with those of a political system within a sustainable economy?

Kuwait’s internal leadership is the link connecting oil export income with the income of the workforce within the country. Since efficiency in the oil sector — whose human resources represent only a small portion of the total workforce across all sectors — is what exclusively affects total oil export income, inefficiency in other sectors poses no real “threat” to the income of workers in the oil sector or in the other sectors linked to oil export revenues.

The absence of this “threat” created a culture that took root over the past seventy years. A leader within the workforce, regardless of his position, so long as he operates outside the oil sector, faces no economic threat to his monthly salary even if he falls short in his work, or if those below him fall short, or even if those above him do. The reason lies in the fact that oil export revenues do not depend on their work performance, or what is known as “productive efficiency.” And if such a leader is exposed to an administrative threat from a higher-ranking professional superior determined to complete his department’s duties properly, these decades have produced an environment that repels such people — those who might pose administrative threats to the inefficient. The reason is the transformation of social habits and the forms of linkage among society’s groups. This culture could only generate the fundamental economic “ailment” — within the scope of the macroeconomy — that created all the problems of microeconomics and organizational behavior. That ailment is powerful enough to alter the nature of relationships among segments of society on the professional level, with negative social and cultural consequences.

At this professional and administrative level, and since productive efficiency is not a requirement for continuity, promotion, or job security — from the highest government office down to the lowest job title in any ministry and the positions in between, in addition to legislative posts — loyalty and shared interests have become the new requirement through which a person gains appreciation. Indeed, through them, he instinctively achieves his own self-interest, so long as what he obtains does not conflict with the law — a law whose provisions may be violated and whose regulations are altered and recolored under the embrace of this unprincipled culture. With habituation and repetition, the matter gradually exceeded the limits of personal benefit. A person became naturally prepared to neglect his work, to falter and delay in completing the affairs of the nation and attending to its interests, in pursuit of a secondary objective: gaining the gratitude of a third party who would secure for him personal interests in another sector or field.

Since this dilemma is recursive in nature, this administrative culture could only cluster around itself, producing generations and groups deficient in professional performance, adapted to the conviction that their own benefits and private interests should come before everyone else — including the nation itself. The more this self-centered clustering grows, neglecting principles and marginalizing professional trust while casting it aside, the more the performance of state sectors declines accordingly. Everyone working within the country then suffers from deteriorating services, including those who helped weave this knot and engineer this clustering. At that point, voices rise in complaint, and the list of grievances grows because individuals face services below the expected standard.

We do not find this absence of “threat” in France or Britain. Whenever productive efficiency declines across sectors — especially legislative ones — national income declines as well, because the French and British economies depend on diversified sources of income flowing through those sectors. This, in turn, creates a new public pressure on general policy in order to repair what has fallen out of balance.

The absence of this “threat” in Kuwait is what makes us reluctant before reform, especially when reform conflicts with our private interests. Our politics, then, must be either democratic within a sustainable economy, or centralized within a rentier economy.

How does democracy and rentier economic incentives affect Kuwait?

Its effect appears in how costs, incentives, and resources are managed, and in Kuwait's ability to turn decisions into sustainable value. The direct context is that Kuwait’s rentier economy weakens productive accountability, distorts democracy, and makes reform harder to sustain.

Why can living standards and productivity not be separated from the factor of incentives?

Living standards cannot remain stable without real productivity, because welfare funded externally or by a depleting resource remains vulnerable. From the angle of incentives, the issue is not measured by its label alone, but by the measurable effect it leaves behind.

Why can rentier culture not be separated from the factor of incentives?

Rentier culture links gains to the state more than to production, making reform look like a threat rather than a necessary transition. From the angle of incentives, the issue is not measured by its label alone, but by the measurable effect it leaves behind.

Why can public debate not be separated from the factor of incentives?

Debate supports reform when it seeks evidence and results; it obstructs reform when it becomes accusation, denial, or short-term gain. From the angle of incentives, the issue is not measured by its label alone, but by the measurable effect it leaves behind.