Long decades have passed with the passing of their days, yet a case such as this has remained immortal, as though society takes pleasure in criticizing it — much like the pleasure of praising “Aunt Hessa’s harees,” whose taste we overanalyze while surrendering to our belief that it is the finest harees we have ever eaten. It is the housing issue, which has worsened for decades between expert criticism and government rebuttal, while the situation remains unchanged to this day. And there is no surprise in that. What value does that familiar pleasure hold today, when we are witnessing ominous signs suggesting that this is an issue whose knot is not truly desired to be untied?

Housing is a basic “benefit” in the life of the citizen, one through which he seeks to obtain the highest possible advantages in return for the “effort” he exerts daily in his work. Yet today, it has become one of the most difficult benefits to own. The reason lies in rising demand coinciding with declining supply. As a result, it becomes difficult for a person to transform his “effort” into the “benefit” of a home worthy of him and his family. The consequences then spread further: a decline in the citizen’s sense of belonging, and the emergence of a rental culture among those practicing supply and demand in the residential real estate sector, until it becomes socially acceptable to live as a tenant in another family’s home, or to rent out part of one’s own home to another family.

Economically, scarcity plays an extremely important role in this sector. The property owner exploits the housing seeker’s need by generating enormous profits through high rents. Here, we see the commercial consequences of that culture. Not to mention that it is a complex problem, given that the property owner himself may once have passed through a scenario resembling the same suffering before finally owning his property, and so the cycle continues. Instead of directing the money supply toward investment and productivity, it has become directed toward achieving citizen welfare through rent. This is what may be called the “dissipation” of the money supply as a result of “artificial scarcity.”

What political actors in the public arena see, and what the ordinary citizen’s mind readily accepts, is that releasing state land in order to increase the supply of land is the optimal solution for eliminating that “artificial scarcity.” Yet in an era whose politicians call for raising state employees’ salaries and writing off loans for all citizens, without deep understanding or economic knowledge, in pursuit of electoral gains and centralized favoritism, we must remove the veil from our eyes and recognize that there is no space that enables such politicians to take the initiative in exposing the economic realities behind this “artificial scarcity,” or in proposing genuine solutions to those realities in order to absorb the dilemmas that have made the continuation of that scarcity necessary. Instead, they confront the decisions of state institutions whenever those institutions move to preserve the structure of that scarcity, directing false accusations against the term “merchants,” a term that is fluid in reality but narrowly defined in theory.

To untie the knot of this dilemma, we find that the banking sector plays a central role in the formation of this “artificial scarcity.” It was the banking sector that financed the citizen who has, in practice, come to fall under the label of “merchant.” It also took the property as collateral in return for financing in order to reduce the risk rate. If financing equals 80% of the collateral’s value, was consideration given to the possibility that the collateral’s value might fall to 70% or 60% as a result of political demands to release land, or political opposition to decisions that preserve this scarcity? At that point, the value of banking-sector assets would decline alarmingly because the risk level of its previous contracts would rise. This would generate severe losses, coinciding with a sharp decline in market value.

The banking sector is a critical sector. Through its operations, it is connected to all commercial, industrial, and investment sectors. Any negative effect on those sectors’ confidence in it produces an even more negative effect on the sectors linked to it. Accordingly, unless the mechanism for eliminating this “artificial scarcity” is systematic and based on carefully designed economic mechanisms, it is logical that the Kuwaiti market could collapse, and unemployment could reach its highest levels, with a negative effect comparable to the events of 2008.

Should we not examine objectively the relationship between the banking sector, other sectors, and this scarcity? Through establishing a future vision such as “raising the rate of suitable homeownership to 100%,” setting the objectives required to achieve that vision, and defining the strategies needed to achieve those objectives by reducing that relationship during its critical phase — the phase in which scarcity fluctuates in an alarming way — until it settles in its proper place, only then may the pleasure of our conversation return to its former state, resembling once again the delight of speaking about “Aunt Hessa’s harees.”

What does the factor of institutions reveal about policy design?

Policies fail when they ignore incentives, costs, and expected behavior; good intentions cannot compensate for flawed design. Through the angle of institutions, the result appears not only in declared language, but in the policy’s ability to change incentives and outcomes.

How does housing scarcity and financial exposure affect Kuwait?

Its effect appears in how costs, incentives, and resources are managed, and in Kuwait's ability to turn decisions into sustainable value. The direct context is kuwait’s housing crisis, linking artificial scarcity, banking exposure, and the need for a gradual ownership strategy.

What does the factor of institutions reveal about reform and slogans?

Real reform defines the problem, cost, metric, timeline, and responsibility, while a slogan relies on general language that does not change incentives. Through the angle of institutions, the result appears not only in declared language, but in the policy’s ability to change incentives and outcomes.