The “constellation” concerned with influencing the internal administration of the state, in the sense explained in the previous sections, is the link connecting oil export income with the income of the workforce inside the country. Since efficiency in the oil sector — whose human resources represent only a small portion of the total workforce across all sectors — is what exclusively affects overall oil export income, inefficiency in other sectors poses no real “threat” to the income of workers in the oil sector or in the other sectors connected to oil export revenues.

The absence of this “threat” created a culture that took root over the past seventy years, since the early signs of oil discovery. A leader within the workforce, whatever his position, so long as he operates outside the oil sector, faces no economic threat to his monthly salary even if he falls short in his work, or if those below him fall short, or even if those above him do. The reason lies in the fact that oil export revenues do not depend on their work performance, or what may be called productive efficiency. And if such a leader were exposed to an administrative threat from a higher-ranking professional superior determined to complete his department’s duties properly, these decades have produced an environment that repels such people — those who might pose administrative threats to the inefficient. The reason is the transformation of social habits and the forms of linkage among society’s groups. This culture could only generate the fundamental economic “ailment” — within the scope of the macroeconomy — that created all the microeconomic problems previously discussed. That ailment, namely the lack of dependence of oil export rent on productive efficiency, is powerful enough to alter the nature of relationships among segments of society on the professional level, with negative social and cultural consequences.

At this professional and administrative level, and since productive efficiency is not a requirement for continuity, promotion, or job security — from the highest position within the aforementioned “constellation,” to the office of the Prime Minister, and down to the lowest job title in any ministry and the positions in between — loyalty and shared interests have become the new requirement through which a person gains appreciation and allegiance. Through them, he instinctively achieves his own self-interest, so long as what he obtains does not conflict with the law — a law whose rules may be violated, altered, and recolored under the embrace of this unprincipled culture. With habituation and repetition, the matter gradually exceeded the limits of personal benefit. A person became naturally prepared to neglect his work, to falter and delay in completing the affairs of the nation and attending to its interests, in pursuit of a secondary objective: gaining the gratitude of a third party who would secure for him personal interests in another sector or field. Since this dilemma is recursive in nature, this administrative culture could only cluster around itself, producing generations and groups deficient in professional performance, adapted to the conviction that their own benefits and private interests should come before everyone else — including the nation itself. The more this self-centered clustering grows, neglecting principles and marginalizing professional trust while casting it aside, the more the performance of state sectors declines accordingly. Everyone working within the country then suffers from deteriorating services, including those who helped weave this knot and engineer this clustering. At that point, voices rise in complaint, and the list of grievances grows because individuals face services below the expected standard.

This ailment has not failed in carrying out its role to perfection. It has established an administrative pyramid built on unhealthy foundations across economic, political, social, cultural, and religious dimensions. The degree of personal benefit and gain varies from one person to another according to his position within that pyramid. The higher his position, the greater his capacity to obtain the largest possible share of what is divided from oil export rent, which flows into the top of the pyramid. It is worth noting that the stability and strength of this pyramid depend entirely on those located at its lower levels. Any disturbance or weakening of their trust in those above them creates a destructive force capable of bringing down the entire administrative pyramid.

In light of all these consequences, the strategy currently followed has emerged: a strategy by which this pyramid is managed according to what has become customary, and according to its aim of dividing and dismantling any union among those of lower rank who focus on exposing the shortcomings of those above them by one rank or more. Implementing this strategy requires countering sound judgment with another opinion set beside it, through the appointment of a compliant leader. That alternative opinion may not be available or ready at the same rank at the moment it is needed. Under such circumstances, this leader is recruited according to legal criteria that are nonetheless unacceptable by the standards of public custom and ethics, due to legislative shortcomings.

How does productivity and hierarchy in rentier administration affect Kuwait?

Its effect appears in how costs, incentives, and resources are managed, and in Kuwait's ability to turn decisions into sustainable value. The direct context is how oil-rent dependence weakened productivity, reshaped incentives, and built an unhealthy administrative hierarchy in Kuwait.

What does the factor of institutions reveal about economic development?

Development becomes sustainable when it builds productivity, skills, institutions, and exports capable of generating renewable value. Through the angle of institutions, the result appears not only in declared language, but in the policy’s ability to change incentives and outcomes.

What does the factor of institutions reveal about exports?

Exports reduce fragility because they widen income sources and force the private sector to test its capacity in markets not protected by the state. Through the angle of institutions, the result appears not only in declared language, but in the policy’s ability to change incentives and outcomes.

What does the factor of institutions reveal about economic visions?

A serious vision reveals the cost of transition, assigns responsibility, and measures results; otherwise it remains a general promise without executive force. Through the angle of institutions, the result appears not only in declared language, but in the policy’s ability to change incentives and outcomes.