The concept of an “economic vision” has been assessed according to differing standards. Only a few months ago, the Kingdom announced its vision, and today Kuwait has announced its own under the slogan “New Kuwait.” Opinions have differed in defining the standards by which visions should be evaluated. Some argue that whoever recognizes the economic value of the strategy behind their vision would be applying double standards if they fail to recognize it in the strategy behind ours — or vice versa.

The presence of the concept of “economic reform” is conclusive evidence that there exists an economic “defect” with which all parties coexist. It is therefore natural that those parties may stumble as reform proceeds. The Kingdom’s vision borrowed much of the strategy outlined in the McKinsey report, whose firmness was accompanied by a clear account of its costs, such as lower per-capita income, lower gross domestic product, and higher unemployment. Through this, we see the Kingdom’s logic in acknowledging the principle that “nothing comes for free,” a principle Kuwait has not accepted, believing that a cost-free strategy is applicable. The issue is surrounded more by political theory than economic theory. For the sake of continuity, it is in the interest of the party entrusted with administration — the government — to convince the delegating party — the public — that it can achieve a promising future for the state “for free,” without touching the interests of the public, even though those interests depend on the very economic defect intended to be repaired “for free.” The question is: how can this defect be repaired without affecting interests built upon it? And how can the public recognize the value of an economic reform that does not actually repair an economic defect? There is no doubt that short-term personal interests may be beneficial to all parties, but in the long term they will turn the state upside down economically.

Kuwait, unlike the Kingdom, built its vision upon a strategy shaped by years of administrative corruption and bureaucracy, then predicted the objectives that such a strategy might achieve. Those objectives are what formed “New Kuwait.” Where, then, is the achievement in that? We may see similarities between the two visions’ strategies only in matters visible to the public, especially with regard to laws and regulations aimed at increasing the government’s net revenues. Yet, theoretically, strengthening the resilience of an economy comes through a costly strategy whose purpose is to increase net exports. Today, we find the Kingdom directing part of the cash flow generated by those laws and regulations toward this strategy, as though it were investing in its economy to secure sustainability. Although this investment may lower the Kingdom’s credit rating in the short term, the Kingdom understands that it carries more positive results in the long term. Kuwait, by contrast, has ignored such investment in order to remain bureaucratically aligned with the strategy of the Economic Reform Document, which was designed to limit the decline of that credit rating.

What we see is that economic reform cannot be achieved in a healthy, firm, and serious manner except within either a democratic environment free from administrative and financial corruption, or a politically authoritarian environment — what we may call a “one-man show.” To what extent is democracy in Kuwait free from administrative and financial corruption? And is the Kingdom truly living through an economic phase led by one man? If the pen falls silent after clarifying the differences in visions and mechanisms of action, can you still see the differences between the two working environments?