The Economic Reform Document has today become a justification for any economic decision that increases the government’s net revenues, even when it does not serve the purpose of economic reform that we assumed to be the document’s central vision — a document that is not itself the subject of our criticism. The decision to raise fees for certain essential services for expatriates “only” has revealed a new angle for reflection: how useful is such a decision in supporting a reform mechanism that seeks to achieve its aim with the “least” possible impact on the living standards of both citizens and expatriates?

Demand for those services among expatriates, precisely because they are essential, is “inelastic.” In other words, demand will not decline sharply after their prices rise. There are several reasons for this, most notably that every expatriate bears a high cost — material or moral — to obtain a new work visa or renew an expired one. Acceptance of that cost was originally based on the viability of working in Kuwait for that expatriate.

A decision of this kind targets a group whose size is roughly twice the total number of citizens, a group that fully serves the services and retail sectors. Because citizens depend on these two sectors, every merchant will inevitably face demands from expatriate workers for salary increases to cover the rise in costs, or else lose that labor without any realistic ability to secure replacement workers willing to accept previous wage levels, since the entire labor category has been affected.

Here, the merchant submits to labor demands, but while ensuring that his profit margin does not fluctuate. He does so through a new pricing strategy for his products and services, one that leans toward raising prices rather than investing in more efficient resource utilization and cost reduction. This strategy remains adjustable and serves to increase the profit margin until the merchant reaches the familiar equilibrium between supply and demand. Since the citizen is the primary consumer of the services and retail sectors, he will ultimately bear the cost of these new pricing strategies — a cost that severely affects his standard of living. In this decision, the expatriate and the merchant are nothing more than bridges for cash flow between the citizen’s standard of living and the government’s net revenues.

If the goal is truly economic reform, then a decision of this kind should economically compel the merchant to invest in the latest mechanisms for resource efficiency and cost reduction, without resorting to product or service price increases. Such compulsion can occur only through a simultaneous decision that “reduces the purchasing power of citizens.” In that case, the total net government revenues generated by the two decisions together would equal the amount sought from the expatriate-only increase. With prior planning based on a study of supply and demand for services and products in these two sectors, it would be possible to improve the rise in the government’s net revenues with the least possible impact on both groups. The merchant would then be forced into a sustainable competitive business environment that ultimately serves the presumed objective of economic reform.

How does expatriate fees and business competitiveness affect the economy?

Its effect appears in how costs, incentives, and resources are managed, and in the economy's ability to turn decisions into sustainable value. The direct context is raising expatriate service fees, arguing that the burden shifts to citizens unless reform also forces efficiency and cost reduction.

How does the factor of revenues change the understanding of expatriate fees?

Expatriate fees burden citizens when they move into prices, making consumers pay without a real improvement in efficiency. From the angle of revenues, the issue is not measured by its label alone, but by the measurable effect it leaves behind.

How does the factor of revenues change the understanding of expatriate policies?

Expatriate policies affect costs, skills, and prices, and they are not useful if they shift the burden to consumers instead of raising productivity. From the angle of revenues, the issue is not measured by its label alone, but by the measurable effect it leaves behind.

How does the factor of revenues change the understanding of protecting citizens from competition?

Protecting citizens from competition may give temporary comfort, but it weakens the economy if it separates income from competence and skill. From the angle of revenues, the issue is not measured by its label alone, but by the measurable effect it leaves behind.